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Abstract
The 2019 Indian general election, and especially the enormous amount of money spent on
campaigning and befriending voters during the election season, has drawn attention to the
question of whether and when “outside” support (in the form of money and other assistance)
from companies and persons not directly involved in an election should be forbidden, tolerated,
or even encouraged. Common reactions to outside influence are inevitably inconsistent, even if
we account for the fact that losers are likely to decry the outside influence that advantaged the
winners or, more likely, the incumbent party expected to win. A novel approach, influenced by
law-and-economics and public choice theory, compares the value of each democratic
jurisdiction deciding its own rules, with one that makes room for significant externalities across
borders and among constitutions. Money transfers, or even vote buying, might make citizens
better off than a constitutional or legislative rule allowing only nonmonetary transfers.
Forbidding all outside influence is impossible as a practical matter and in a way that is
consistent with free speech and other democratic values. Some money transfers might also be a
means of taking intense preferences into account. The most important result is that common
intuitions are likely to be wrong and are, in any event, certainly inconsistent.
I.

Introduction

The 2019 Indian general election, and especially the enormous amount of money spent on
campaigning and befriending voters during the election season, has drawn attention to the
question of whether and when “outside” support (in the form of money and other assistance)
from companies and persons not directly involved in an election should be forbidden, tolerated,
or even encouraged. Common reactions to outside influence are negative, but ultimately and
necessarily inconsistent. The losing side (or sides) is likely to regard vote buying through any
means as anti-democratic, as well as a practice that fosters corruption. It is unusual for the losing
party (or parties) to have collected more money, 2 or more outside money, than the winning party,
but this alone hardly proves that money brings about victory in a political campaign. Donors, as
we might call them, are often looking for rewards, and thus are more likely to support the
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Thanks to Paresh Lal for help with the details of and insights regarding Indian law.
There is a strong correlation between electoral success and fundraising. See Wesley Lowery, “91% of the
time the better-financed candidate wins. Don’t act surprised.” The Atlantic (2014). The correlation holds in
many countries, though it hard to ignore the obvious selection effect; donors may prefer to give to candidates
expected to win. See Gary W. Cox and Michael F. Thies, How Much Does Money Matter? “Buying” Votes in
Japan, 1967-1990, 33 Comparative Political Studies 37-57 (2000); Myungsoon Shin, Youngjae Jin, Donald A.
Gross, and Kihong Eom, Money Matters in Party-Centered Politics: Campaign Spending in Korean
Congressional Elections, 24 Electoral Studies 85-101 (2005).
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perceived winner and the incumbent party. 3 When in doubt, it is not unusual for donors to give to
multiple contestants. Their goal is often not so much to influence the election, but to gain favor
with the eventual winner or even with the incumbent during the period prior to the election.
As Part II will show, it is difficult to fashion a consistent policy about outside, or cross-border,
influences on politics. The discussion considers arguments based, first, on an idealized version of
democratic rule, and then on one driven by the reality that what happens in one country, or
jurisdiction, often affects another. These sensible approaches, labeled here as “confidence-indemocracy” and “concern-for-externalities,” are shown to be in tension with one another. Part III
then develops the somewhat surprising case for allowing or even encouraging outside
interventions, especially in the form of money. It touches on ideas about decision-making outside
of general elections, including the question of whether elected legislators ought to be able to pay
one another for votes, and whether there is an argument for allowing judges on multi-member
panels to do the same. Part IV concludes and suggests that allowing or even welcoming limited
interference in politics, whether from inside or outside a jurisdiction, may be a second-best
solution for some democracies.
II.

Democracy and externalities

A.
Confidence-in-democracy
There are at least two important arguments against outside influence. 4 First, that the very idea of
democracy is that those who are governed should decide things for themselves, normally by
majority vote or by delegation to representatives or their delegees. The matter is complicated in
India because many people remain registered in constituencies where they matured rather than in
jurisdictions in which they live, and where voting has a direct impact; voters rarely return to their
home districts to cast votes. 5 Indian law seems aimed at preserving long term affiliations or
ensuring that elected representatives will have strong ties to their original home constituencies. 6
A second principle is that outside interest groups are likely to be tilted in favor of moneyed
interests, and so should be limited or forbidden to interfere. Democratic decision-making, and
3

See Taylor C. Boas, Daniel Hidalgo, and Neal P. Richardson, The Spoils of Victory: Campaign Donations
and Government Contracts in Brazil, 76 Journal of Politics 415-429 (2014); Michael Barber, Donation
Motivations: Testing Theories of Access and Ideology, 69 Political Research Quarterly 148-159 (2016). For an
interesting proposal to reduce the influence-based incentives of political donations, see Ian Ayres and Jeremy
Bulow, The Donation Booth: Mandating Donor Anonymity to Disrupt the Market for Political Influence, 50
Stanford Law Review 837-891 (1998);
4
To be sure, there are many other arguments that can developed against vote buying. Perhaps votes should be
inalienable because they are personal and reflect a core human capacity. It is impossible to take on all such
arguments here, as conceded in Part III, but the discussion concentrates on the two arguments noted in the text.
As for an argument that voting is about human dignity, and must therefore never be commodified, note that
very few democracies make voting mandatory, and this is perhaps an indication that it is something that
belongs to the individual, who can set it aside or sell it. The argument against any one entity or person having
multiple votes is more difficult to develop or defeat. Democracies allow coalitions and political parties, and
these are devices for combining votes, and are rarely criticized on the basis of dignity-based arguments.
5
See Anupama Roy, Identifying Citizens: Electoral Rolls, the Right to Vote, and the Election Commission of
India, 11 Election Law Journal: Rules, Politics, and Policy 170-186 (2012). Nevertheless, for the purposes of
the discussion here, it is easier to think of a democratic model as opposed to an externality model, while
keeping in mind that the democracy model is imperfect, or can be subdivided, because of voter registration
systems.
6
See Representation of the People Act 1951 (Part II.—Acts of Parliament), Chapters I–II.
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majority vote in particular, is an alternative to markets; a central decision for a democracy is to
decide what should be allocated to markets as opposed to voting – and then to judges or other
government decision-makers bodies appointed by elected officials or elected in direct fashion.
Some of this allocation between markets and democratic decision-making is written into
constitutions, but some is decided by democratic decision-making itself, as when governments
decide to privatize some government functions or – to the contrary – to forbid private ownership
of weapons, and monopolize law and order in the hands of the government. 7 Even when we
understand that the government (or the constitution) decides what is allocated to governmental
decision-making, there is the underlying question of whether some form of market is available to
affect elections, and thus the lawmaking itself. Every democracy allows candidates for office to
hire advertising firms and to rely on polls run in the private sector, to take two simple examples,
so there is always some outsourcing to private markets. All democracies permit neighbors to try
to influence one another through conversation, so that a one-person-one-vote principle is subject
to rules or market-mechanisms that influence how voters are informed. Any system that
penalizes citizens who try to influence fellow citizens’ political judgments would be derided as
illiberal. It is probably impossible to completely separate politics from markets.
Still, some countries, like the United States, forbid money contributions from abroad to political
parties or candidates for office, while other countries do not. 8 India permits limited contributions
from foreign entities, and places various limits on contributions, especially to individuals rather
than parties, but enforcement of these rules is difficult and rare. 9 Most of these countries allow

7

Political elections as currently organized have many defects but also some obvious virtues. Among these
virtues is that no voter or contributor who prefers candidate G has reason to vote for, or to support, H. In
contrast, a market in votes will create the risk that voters, while holding out for higher prices or waiting to buy
at lower prices, will vote or sell perversely. This does not rise to the level of a paradox, because it is not as if
the rational voter is expected to vote for the candidate she least prefers (at the offered price), but it does
amount to a serious danger that markets will do harm rather than good, even when measured on their own
terms. Another, perhaps overwhelming, defect of a market in voting rights, is that wealth effects might
dominate preference intensities, just where a majority is inclined to limit the effects of unequal wealth. But
there are ways of limiting wealth effects. Eventually, limited markets may retain the quality of avoiding
perverse voting behavior even as they remain simple enough to provide a sense of legitimacy.
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For United States law, see 52 USC § 30121. India, as of 2016, relaxed its legal definition of “foreign” for
purposes of foreign contributions, which are still unlawful. See Milan Vaishnav, Political Finance in India:
Déjà Vu All Over Again, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace (2019). Canada, France, Israel, Mexico,
and Brazil do not allow any foreign corporations or entities, or domestic corporations, to make political
donations. At the other extreme South Africa, has no campaign restrictions, and Italy, does not restrict foreign
donations. In the middle are Germany and Russia, which allow corporate giving if firms are not majority
foreign-owned. Japan has recently legalized foreign corporate contributions. Jieun Lee, Foreign Direct
Investment in Political Influence, Working Paper, 2018.
https://www.internationalpoliticaleconomysociety.org/sites/default/files/paper-uploads/2018-10-28-21_42_07leejieun@umich.edu.pdf. Within the United States, Alaska now restricts partially-foreign-owned corporations
from spending in its elections process. See Alaska Stat. § 15.13.068 (2018), 132 Harvard Law Review 24022409 (2019).
9
See Ellen L. Weintraub and Samuel C. Brown, Following the Money: Campaign Finance Disclosure in India
and the United States, 11 Election Law Journal: Rules, Politics, and Policy, 241-266 (2012).
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domestic contributions, though sometimes these are subject to limits. 10 It is apparent, but also
usually attractive, that each jurisdiction (or nation) decides the degree to which markets and
wealth are permitted to influence democratic decision-making. Outright bribes and vote buying
might be forbidden, whether from inside or outside a jurisdiction, and we can imagine that each
jurisdiction is trusted to decide its own rules consistent with democratic, self-rule principles.
Each decides on the allocation between markets and politics, and then also about the degree to
which money is allowed to influence politics (from inside or the outside). Confidence-indemocracy is consistent with a view that each jurisdiction will do a good job if allowed to decide
these rules for itself. 11 It leads to the principle that each jurisdiction should decide in some
democratic way how much, and what kind of, outside influence to permit. For example, and
quite relevant to India, and several other nations, a country might decide to allow citizens who
“intend” to return home to vote while they are abroad, even though this presents obvious
problems of enforcement. An alternative is to require citizens to return “home” in order to vote,
as is the case in Israel. 12 With respect to this and other matters, the more one has confidence in
democracy, the more one is inclined to trust a state to decide its own rules.
We might expect institutions that are liberal in this regard to require disclosure of the source of
funds that affect political outcomes. Just as some jurisdictions require candidates for office to
announce the source of their campaign funds and their approval of campaign advertisements,
they might be even more insistent that the voters know when influence has come from outside
the jurisdiction. Such revelation might help or disadvantage a candidate running for office, but if
the idea is to abide by the confidence-in-democracy idea, then voters need all the knowledge that
can be mustered. I will return below to the question of why voters might like direct contributions
from abroad, whether or not disclosed to their compatriots. Similarly, each jurisdiction can
decide in democratic fashion how much its government or its citizens are permitted to try and
influence other jurisdictions. Interference is an export as well as an import. No symmetry is
required, and there is certainly no need for a balance of trade. Americans and Europeans may be
horrified at the prospect of Russian influence on their elections, but they take as given their own
newspapers’ and politicians’ freedom to try and influence Russia’s government or Israel’s
elections. A trade imbalance is considered desirable and even moral, when the observer is
confident about right and wrong.
There is an analogy here – or even a direct symmetry in law – to boycotts. Most democracies feel
free to boycott the goods of another nation, much as individuals feel free to choose one store
10

Canada, for instance, does not allow corporate campaign contributions at the federal level, though some
provinces allow corporations to contribute to parties. For the federal Canadian rule, see Canada Elections Act,
S.C. 2000, c. 9, 363(1). For a discussion of provincial rules, see D. M. Brock and H. J. Hanson, Raising,
Spending, and Regulating Party Finances in the Provinces, 9 Canadian Political Science Review 55-74 (2015).
Israel does not allow campaign contributions by corporations to national political candidates. LOC
https://www.loc.gov/law/help/campaign-finance/israel.php. France has a nearly total ban on entity
contributions, other than political parties and certain groups. https://www.loc.gov/law/help/campaignfinance/france.php.
11
A country might decide to allow citizens who “intend” to return home, to vote while they are abroad, though
this presents obvious problems of enforcement. As emphasized in the text, the more one believes in
democracy, the more a state ought to be trusted to decide its own rules.
12
See Rainer Baubock, Expansive Citizenship: Voting beyond Territory and Membership, 38 PS: Political
Science and Politics, 683-687 (2005).
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over another, and even to advertise a private boycott, whether for personal or political reasons.
An example of political aims was the wide boycott of Apartheid-era South Africa, beginning in
the 1960s and ending in the 1990s when true elections began. Nations feel free to ban both
exports and imports, often for political reason, and they may do one and not the other. They may
forbid their citizens from visiting another country while not refusing entry to citizens from that
country. Correspondingly, foreign trade is used to encourage political regimes abroad, or to
encourage instability. The conflict between externalities and democratic thinking disappears in
the minority of cases where the cross-border intervention can be said to promote democracy in
the foreign country, for the point is to advance confidence-in-democracy.
B.
Externalities
A second, often opposing, view, is that it is fair and efficient to allow outside influence because
the confidence-in-democracy idea does not fully consider the utility of people in other
jurisdictions. One country might want to encourage another to pollute less or to save an
endangered species, and it might do so by trying to influence political decisions across borders.
Readers who start out intuitively opposed to outside intervention, usually because it favors the
moneyed class or it interferes with the confidence-in-democracy idea, should consider two
counter-points. First, many democracies, including India, allow internal money to be used for
advertisements and other campaign expenses. 13 This can be defended as necessary to inform
voters, to allow for free speech, or to allow for the expression of intense preferences. Second,
nothing stops a democracy from limiting or banning inside and outside money, unless there is a
constitutional restraint on free speech grounds. 14
Law-and-economics suggests a third reaction, based on the external effects of one jurisdiction on
the citizens of another. If, for instance, the U.S. is worried about climate change so much that its
government or several of its citizens use their wealth to encourage India to use different fuels, or
to “pay” for India to pass legislation that limits the use of certain kinds of coal, would anyone
really object on the grounds of a distaste for outside influence and a tampering with India’s
democratic process? Both sides would be better off – as is true of most transactions – as one
side’s greater wealth would benefit the less-well-off recipient. The benefit comes in the form of
the transferred resources, and might be enhanced by long-term environmental benefits. There is
well-known moral objection to one country paying another to accept pollutants, or simply trash,
but it is unlikely that there would be a similar objection to payments made in order to improve
the environment rather than to transfer unwanted materials form one country to another. These
examples nearly dispose of the argument that it is always offensive for wealth to affect crossborder arrangements.
It remains, however, for us to consider the claim that cross-border interference on grounds of
externalities is only acceptable when wealth serves to advance a common good, at least as
perceived by the international community. Most people look back on the international
13

See David Gilmartin and Robert Moog, Introduction to “Election Law in India,” 18 Election Law Journal:
Rules, Politics, and Policy, 136-148 (2012); M. V. Rajeev Gowda and E. Sridharan, Reforming India’s Party
Financing and Election Expenditure Laws, 18 Election Law Journal: Rules, Politics, and Policy, 226-240
(2012).
14
The United States remains an anomaly in this regard. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1975); Citizens
United v. Federal Election Commission, 558 U.S. 310 (2010).
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Anti-Apartheid movement with admiration, and most regard cross-state Freedom Riders (Civil
Rights activists in the U.S. who went from Northern to Southern states in the 1960s to promote
the cause of civil rights) as heroes, rather than as persons who could afford to travel to other
states and thus impose their preferences regarding racial equality. Had it been the reverse, with
rich Southerners in the U.S. traveling north to encourage race discrimination, we might well
frame the objection as one based on using wealth to influence politics in another jurisdiction. The
larger claim is that interference from other jurisdictions is simply based on the politics or
preferences of the observer, so that there is no right answer to the general question about outside
intervention and influence. This claim is stronger when the interference is in the hands of
wealthier countries or people, so that we cannot be sure that their utility can be compared with
that or poorer people or jurisdictions. If a group thinks that a policy or candidate in its own
jurisdiction is morally offensive, it will disapprove of foreign interference that solidifies this
policy or candidate. And if the foreign interference is an attempt to undo what is regarded as
offensive, then suddenly foreign interference will be welcomed by the global community.
But imagine that we can put wealth aside, as when there is a serious limit on individual
politically directed contributions, or when two jurisdictions, or adherents to opposing viewpoints,
have similar wealth per capita. In this case, there is a reasonable argument for foreign
interference because of external, or cross-border, effects. Consider the case where one state, O,
has factories that employ many people but that also pollute the atmosphere; prevailing winds
drive these pollutants to the east, to a neighboring jurisdiction, P. Voters in O might rationally
prefer laws that permitted the pollution because they do not take the cost and preferences of P’s
citizens into account. An even more interesting case is where P’s citizens value scenic beauty
that for some reason does not appeal to citizens of O. O will not take P’s (pure) preferences into
account. If there is some negative externality running in the other direction, O and P might
simply agree that each will behave in a way that satisfies the other. If not, a law-and-economics
reaction, beginning with the Coase Theorem, is that the government of P could buy the factories
in O and install better smokestacks, or shut them down with some payment to employees. 15 But
the more interesting application of the bargaining idea is for P, or interest groups in that
jurisdiction, to pay O to enact laws that reduce the pollution or save the scenic view. Another
version of this kind of foreign interference or influence would be to finance the election of
political candidates in O, who promise to reduce the pollution. Finally, and somewhat
equivalently, P or some of its offended citizens, might actually pay voters in O in order to change
the outcome; these recipients would vote for new environmental laws or for politicians who are
dedicated to reducing the problem that largely affects the neighboring state, P. Payments from
across the border can in this way change the political outcome and take account of the negative
externality suffered by non-voting, foreign citizens. It is apparent that voters in O (and especially
poorer voters, though the discussion here has tried to eliminate the issue of wealth disparities)
might be better off with a rule that allows or even encourages payments from abroad, and this is
especially so if some of the transferred money is directed to workers in O who are made worse
15

See R.H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 Journal of Law and Economics 1-44 (1960); Fred S.
McChesney, Rent Extraction and Interest-Group Organization in a Coasean Model of Regulation, 20 Journal
of Legal Studies 73-90 (1991). For a re-interpretation of Coase’s case study of lighthouses which argues that
public-private bargaining reaches an efficient result, rather than private-private bargaining as Coase originally
indicated, see Elodie Bertrand, The Coasean Analysis of Lighthouse Financing: Myths and Realities, 30
Cambridge Journal of Economics 389-402 (2005).
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off. This is the essence of the concern-for-externalities argument in favor of allowing foreign
payments, or other intrusions.
The assumption, or trick, of eliminating wealth effects is not entirely fanciful, but size effects
must also be taken into account. It is common, for example, though perhaps tongue-in-cheek, to
hear citizens of The Netherlands or of Canada say that they ought to vote in American elections,
inasmuch as American policies, and especially its trade and tax policies, have a great impact on
these other countries. To be sure, this impact is less than that experienced by residents of New
York or other domestic groups in the United States, but at least these groups have votes.
Presumably the Dutch would be happy with an arrangement that gave each Dutch voter one-fifth
of a vote in U.S. elections, though it is hardly clear how the right percentage would be calculated
and adjusted over time. The suggestion is fanciful for several reasons. Dutch and Canadian
citizens do not pay taxes to the United States; they would hardly agree that the U.S. could draft
them in case of war; and they would hardly agree that Americans should get comparable votes in
elections in their countries, if only because the vast number of U.S. voters, even if each is given a
mere fraction of a vote, would overwhelm the voters who live in Canada and The Netherlands.
Relative size does not, however, explain much; it seems absurd to say that residents of Pakistan
should vote in Indian elections, though there are even greater externalities in that setting. Crossborder externalities or conflicts are better decided by discussion or even by payments or threats
of a sort. Externalities do not translate well to votes, though they surely influence votes within
each jurisdiction.
It is important to see that the “confidence-in-democracy” and “concern-for-externalities”
approaches are not always in conflict, however easy it is to see particular cases of conflict. The
more we have faith in democracy, the more a country like O, in the stylized example just
presented, should be trusted when it allows or disallows payments or other interference from
abroad. But a slightly weaker form of the confidence-in-democracy approach takes differing
wealth into account and suggests that democracy is itself a choice not to have a market, and thus
not to allow the buying and selling of policies, politicians’ power, or votes. In the case of O and
P, and depending on how money arriving from P is allocated to government projects or voters in
O, people in O can be made better off by allowing outside interference from P. And yet, there is
something startling and offensive about the prospect of vote buying. If it really benefits
recipients, even as it permits citizens of P to express their preferences, then why not favor
markets for votes quite generally? This question is addressed below in Part III.
There is, it should be noted, a different kind of political solution that sometimes discourages P
from paying O, or even encourages O to lose the option of encouraging P to pay for the right to
impose costs on some citizens of O. Instead of bargaining, either can go to a superior legislature.
If, for example, P and O are states within a single nation that has the power to create binding
national rules, then P might coordinate with other states that pay taxes from wealth created by
their (polluting) factories and obtain the “right” to pollute up to some level from the national
legislature. Citizens of O will now have lost the advantage that tort law might give them,
although they can still pay P to reduce the pollution heading towards O. Similarly, O might find
it difficult to extract payment from P sufficient to compensate O, and O might coordinate with
other states suffering from wind-blown pollutants and they might have the votes to get a national
anti-pollution rule. This power to obtain national legislation might reduce some of the problems
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emphasized here, unless the national legislature is also captured by wealth effects. In the case
where O and P are not states within a nation, but sovereign and separate nations, the possibility
of law taking charge is diminished. Countries like O might seek international treaties, but these
can be ignored; they might try to involve the United Nations in the same way that states try to
combine interests and impose rules by a national government, but again these rules have much
less power. The European Union is a nice example of an intermediate “solution,” and it is no
surprise that some of its rules are welcome by some member countries but much resented by
others.
In sum, there is something of a conflict between confidence-in-democracy and a concern for
positive and negative externalities. Within the United States, and in other countries that allow
cross-border contributions to political campaigns, it is common for residents of one state to
contribute to candidates or causes in another. It is even more common for individuals to refuse to
buy goods from other states, or to go out of their way to visit or patronize other states. The usual
justification draws on externalities; people are affected, and sometimes simply morally offended
(or thrilled) by what happens in other jurisdictions. We have already seen that it is difficult to
limit this argument, and that it is often in conflict with a faith-in-democracy in the receiving
jurisdiction. The conflict can be eliminated as an intellectual matter if we take the confidence-indemocracy argument further than is usually done, by reasoning that a jurisdiction can simply
legislate that it welcomes – or forbids – outside contributions, with or without limits. In any
event, when applied to real cases, such attempts to resolve the tension between democratic
principles and worrisome externalities, leads to the observation that one’s views on cross-border
contributions, whether in-kind or in cash, and even contributions within a single jurisdiction
(which is to say debates about the wisdom of limiting private financing of political campaigns),
quickly reflects the observer’s preferences about the winners and losers. Those who contribute to
causes that are later seen as obviously correct and moral are regarded as heroes, while those who
fund causes or officials that come to be seen as destructive are regarded as reprehensible or even
criminal. As before, the continuing task here is to identify nonpolitical arguments for one rule or
another.
III.

Money in Politics

Consider first the familiar problem of vote buying. It is unlawful in virtually every jurisdiction
for one judge to pay another to change his or her vote. Similarly, it is generally regarded as
wrongful for me to pay my neighbor in cash so that he will vote for my favorite candidate,
though secret ballots make enforcement, and therefore such agreements, difficult. On the other
hand, I may discuss the coming election with my neighbor and even take time off from work
(and thus lose money) to try to influence my neighbor to vote as I prefer. An economist would
point out that, in this last example, my sacrifice along with the fact that my neighbor does not
receive anything of value, shows that I have a strong belief or preference, while the neighbor is
only receiving information. Payment in such a case might truly satisfy intense preferences, and
thus increase overall utility. It seems acceptable to say to a neighbor: “I want you and others to
vote for X. If X wins the election, I will give $1,000 to your favorite charity, in order to
encourage you to vote for X.” My intensity and the fact that the voter is not personally enriched
seems decisive. It is common, on the other hand, for legislators, or friends in a restaurant where
food is shared, to “buy” a vote by agreeing to vote or order food in a way that gives both parties
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the thing he or she wants most. It might seem unacceptable to pay one friend to order a certain
dish, but that is because of the external effect on other friends in the group. In addition,
differential wealth distribution reduces our confidence that a payment genuinely shows that one
party has a greater preference than another.
We are ready to see campaign finance issues, within a single jurisdiction, in a new light. Current
law in virtually every jurisdiction forbids direct vote buying but permits and even protects a
willing buyer who is eager to buy votes indirectly through advertising and other campaign
expenditures. If direct vote buying were permitted, we would expect buyers to look first to
unlikely, unmotivated, or simply indifferent voters, as a source of eager sellers. 16 These citizens
do not place great value on their votes, and would likely sell a vote at a very low price. If buyers
need a great number of votes, they will eventually need to buy from more motivated voters, who
either enjoy voting or, more likely have stronger preferences about the outcome and, irrationally
perhaps, believe their votes might be decisive. If this second group can be identified and tends to
be the same from election to election, then their members will, by virtue of their strong
preferences and constant participation in elections, set the legal rules over time. It is therefore not
surprising that this group establishes rules against vote buying. It is as if they know that their
votes will be less influential if a buyer can amass the votes of the unmotivated voters, who would
otherwise be likely to stay home or randomly distribute votes in ways that do not affect the
outcomes in most elections. Only rarely will very highly motivated buyers of votes need to go so
far as to buy the more expensive votes held by the highly motivated voters, who are typically
dispersed or only loosely coordinated. If the unmotivated citizens have some say in the initial
rules, or the government or constitution sets the rules early on with an eye on their later impact, it
would not be surprising to see laws protecting the unmotivated voters against whipsaw, as it is
called in the corporate and securities law literature. 17 As a practical matter they should be
expected to constitutionalize restrictions against vote buying. The unmotivated voters are
numerous but not organized. If only they could combine forces, they would see that a party that
bought many of their votes has purchased something quite valuable, and the sellers would
therefore design a rule that gave each seller an amount equal to the highest price paid to any
seller. 18 Alternatively, the motivated voters might (and do) develop a rule that banned the
purchase of votes, knowing they would be outvoted by a party that bought a substantial set of
votes from those who attached a lower value to voting.
The analysis is more complicated, but perhaps more rather than less convincing, when wealth
differentials are added more completely to the picture. If poorer voters are as motivated to vote
as more fortunate citizens, they might still favor a rule that allows the sale of votes, because
some interest group will offer more money (or other benefits) than the vote is worth to any
individual. This is especially so when each voter knows that solving the collective action
problem among voters is difficult. If I know that my vote is just one of many, I will surely accept
a dollar for my vote, for it is essentially worth nothing to me, unless I think that holding out will
raise the price. What drives up the price is likely to be competition from other prospective
16

A more expansive version of the argument found in this Part can be found in Saul Levmore, Voting with
Intensity, 53 Stanford Law Journal 159 (2000).
17
See Levmore, supra note 16. Inasmuch as voter turnout in India is relatively high, they are referred to here as
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buyers. The buyer of votes like mine needs to offer enough to discourage competitors from an
auction for votes like mine. In public choice terms, the result is interesting and close to what we
observe. Those who can solve the collective action problem, like a large corporation that stands
to gain from a specific government policy, will find it worthwhile to give money to the candidate
or party it expects to win. The recipient needs this money to defeat opponents or simply to enjoy
life. In turn, the receiving party will spend much of this money “buying” votes from those who
cannot solve their collection problem. No one will pay $3 to a CEO for his vote, and expect
much in return. But the CEO might pay thousands of dollars to gain favor with a person or party
that is likely to be in a position to award contracts or other favors, knowing that the recipient will
use this money to pay $3 per vote to voters who are not organized and not particularly motivated.
There is more to the story from the point of view of those who are not particularly motivated and
who have little expectation of forming coalitions. As we have seen, they will benefit if parties or
other entities compete for their votes, but we have not yet touched on the question of whether
they (rather than the empowered voters or interest groups) benefit from a ban on vote buying. If
there is an effective ban of this kind, interest groups will turn to non-monetary benefits. They
may make extravagant campaign promises or hold lavish meetings, or pay for campaign workers
to go from home to home to try to convince (what I have called) unmotivated people to vote one
way or another. All this is less attractive to the recipients than is cash; it is also, and perhaps of
greater interest to see that it is, an inefficient waste of resources. The money spent on nonmonetary inducements is largely a waste of resources compared to cash. Cash allows each
recipient can spend on goods he or she truly wants. From the point of view of poorer voters who
are not organized, it is likely that vote selling is more attractive than its likely alternatives. To be
sure, this claim ignores other arguments including the idea that many poor people, along with
their more fortunate fellow citizens, think of voting as a matter of dignity, and thus favor its
inalienability. As is apparent, the discussion here has focused on two important arguments,
labeled as confidence-in-democracy and concern-for-externalities, and it has not insisted that
there are no other reasons to fear even limited vote buying. As emphasized shortly, the case for
vote buying is a second-best one.
IV.

Conclusion

In the best of all worlds, significant resources would be spent providing public goods that really
benefit the citizenry. Few resources would be wasted on campaign strategies or on inefficient
favors eventually handed out as pay-back to those who contribute to the winning party in an
election. But when the private interests of politicians and donors are unlikely to move in this
direction, the second-best outcome could conceivably be a transfer of wealth from donors to
those recipients who will accept small payments for their support. They may do so because they
are unmotivated voters – because they know that one vote makes little difference, because they
are not well organized into groups, because they have lost faith in government, or for a host of
other reasons. The task of law is surely to move towards the first-best solution, in which
governments provide useful public goods, and campaigns are limited to providing useful
information to voters. In this first-best world, public goods are provided on the basis of taxes and
votes that reflect the wisdom of crowds and the ability to pay. But when law has not succeeded
in bringing a democracy to this state, it should be no surprise to see payments intended to impact
politics in the ways described here. When compared to the most desirable forms of democracies,
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it is painful to see, but it may be a kind of second-best result, especially when seen from the eyes
of those who are paid, in one way or another, for their political support.
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